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RESHAPING THE TRADITIONAL LIMITS
OF AFFIRMATIVE DUTIES UNDER THE
THIRD RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ* & CHRISTOPHER E. APPEL**
INTRODUCTION
"Trial lawyers handling tort cases have a powerful new tool:

the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and
Emotional Harm."' So reads the first sentence of an April 2010
article jointly authored by Restatement Reporter Professor
Michael Green 2 and former President of the Association of Trial
Lawyers of America (now called the American Association for
Justice) Larry Stewart in Trial magazine, the monthly publication
of the trial lawyer group. In the article, titled "The New
Restatement's Top 10 Tort Tools," the authors discuss significant
liability creating or enhancing changes in the Restatement and its
"Many Clarifications and Modifications That You Can Use to Your
Clients' Advantage." 3 Included on this "Top Ten" list of trial lawyer
treasures are several provisions of Chapter 7 of the new
Restatement dealing with Affirmative Duties, the subject of this

* Victor E. Schwartz is Chairman of the Public Policy Group in the
Washington, D.C. office of the law firm of Shook Hardy & Bacon L.L.P. He
coauthors the most widely used torts casebook in the United States, PROSSER,
WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS (12th ed. 2010). He has served on the Advisory
Committee of the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law (Third)
Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm project. Mr. Schwartz
received his B.A. summa cum laude from Boston University and his J.D.
magna cum laude from Columbia University.
** Christopher E. Appel is an associate in the Public Policy Group in the
Washington, D.C. office of Shook Hardy & Bacon L.L.P. He received his B.S.
from the University of Virginia's McIntire School of Commerce and his J.D.
from Wake Forest University School of Law.
1. Michael D. Green & Larry S. Stewart, The New Restatement's Top 10
Tort Tools, TRIAL, April 2010, at 44.
2. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional
Harm project has had a series of Reporters. The original project Reporter,
Professor Gary Schwartz, passed away in 2001. He was succeeded by Texas
School of Law Dean William C. Powers and Wake Forest University School of
Law Professor Michael Green. Dean Powers became the President of the
University of Texas in 2006, placing the principal drafting responsibilities of
the Restatement project with Professor Green.
3. Green & Stewart, supra note 1, at 44.
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Article. 4
Traditionally, those in charge of the Restatement projects of
the American Law Institute (ALI) have avoided any publication
that could present the appearance of an agenda favoring either
plaintiffs or defendants.5 While there is not an ALI "rule" against
such activity, the reason for this tradition is that Restatements are
primarily a vehicle for judicial education.6 They are viewed by
judges as an objective and neutral voice that "restates" the most
thoughtfully reasoned existing case law, reflecting sound liability
rules and public policy.7 The review process behind each
Restatement is set to preclude ALI Reporters and their Advisory
Committees from writing their own "tort code"; some case law
must exist to support each black letter rule.8
In many respects, Chapter 7 of the new Restatement fulfills
this core mission. As the product of over a decade of drafting and
refinement,9 it offers a more streamlined approach to the
fundamentals of tort law than the Second Restatement, which was
adopted in 1965, and reflects several generations of legal
development.' 0 It also develops topics that were more inchoate at
the time of the Second Restatement. For example, the new
Restatement speaks to important affirmative duty issues that the
previous Restatement did not anticipate."
Nevertheless, there are a few areas, several of which are
mentioned in Professor Green and former ATLA President

4. Id. at 47.
5. E.g., Victor E. Schwartz, The Restatement, Third, Torts: Product
Liability: A Model of Fairness and Balance, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 41, 41
(2000).
6. The ALI's purpose is "educational" and includes "promot[ing] the
clarification and simplification of the law and its better adaptation to social
needs . . . ." AM. LAW INST., BYLAWS § 1.01(A) (2007), available at
http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.bylaws.
7. See John P. Frank, The American Law Institute, 1923-1998, 26
HOFSTRA L. REV. 615, 638-39 (1998) (noting that as of March 1994 there were
125,000 published court citations to Restatements, covering all fifty states).
8. Victor E. Schwartz, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability-The American Law Institute's Process of Democracy and
Deliberation,26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 743, 746 (1998). The ALI does conduct other
projects, such as the Model Penal Code, where full latitude to "create" law is
available. Id. at 746, n.13.
9. See Current Projects: Restatement Third, Torts: Liability for Physical
and Emotional Harm, AM. LAW INST., http://ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=proje
cts.projip&projectid=16 (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) (stating that the project
was approved in 1996).
10. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM intro. (2005) (stating that the new installment replaces and
supersedes Divisions 2 and 3 of the Restatement Second, "complet[ing] the
coverage of significant terrain in tort law.").
11. See infra Section I.
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Stewart's "Top Ten" article, 12 that endeavor to push the traditional
boundaries of affirmative duties into new and uncharted territory.
This Article examines these changes, and their potential to
dramatically expand liability. Specifically, the Article focuses on
two key sections of Chapter 7 of the new Restatement, which
invite courts down a new path of broad liability expansion.
Part I begins with an overview of Chapter 7 of the new
Restatement for judges and other readers who may be unfamiliar
with its organization and content. It examines the similarities and
differences of this Restatement with the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. Part II then identifies how several of these differences
could, if adopted by courts, be used to create or enhance liability in
unprecedented ways. Part III discusses the public policy effects of
implementing these changes, and the potential for blurring or
eradicating traditional common law duty lines.
The Article concludes that specific provisions in Chapter 7
that open the door to broad and possibly unintended liability
should not be adopted by courts. They are unlike the traditional,
objective Restatement provisions and should be treated with great
skepticism. The Article further demonstrates that sound public
policy counsels in favor of maintaining longstanding affirmative
duty rules that place both plaintiffs and defendants on sound
footing and provide each party with clear duty lines and notice of
conduct that will result in liability.
With Chapter 7 scheduled for final publication in 2011, and
sections already discussed by some state high courts,13 it is highly
likely that more courts will be confronted with claims seeking to
expand common law duty rules. The purpose of this Article is to
assist courts in their evaluation of this new and expansive
Restatement chapter.

I.

OVERVIEW OF AFFIRMATIVE DUTIES IN THE THIRD
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS

Affirmative duties arise when tort law places an obligation of
due care on one party, typically the defendant, to prevent or limit
an injury to another.14 This duty may exist because the defendant
12. Green & Stewart, supra note 1, at 47.
13. E.g., A.W. v. Lancaster Cnty. Sch. Dist. 0001, 784 N.W.2d 907, 917
(Neb. 2010); Van Fossen v. MidAmerican Energy Co., 777 N.W.2d 689, 696-97
(Iowa 2009). But see Riedel v. ICI Americas, Inc., 968 A.2d 17, 20 (Del. 2009)
(declining to adopt any section of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability
for Physical and Emotional Harm).
14. E.g., Bacchus v. Ameripride Serv., Inc., 179 P.3d 309, 313 (Idaho 2008)
(stating that an affirmative duty to assist someone else only arises when a
special relationship exists between the parties); Hills v. Bridgeview Little
League Ass'n, 745 N.E.2d 1166, 1179 (111. 2000) ('The general rule [is] that one
has no affirmative duty to control others . . . ."); Coombes v. Florio, 877 N.E.2d
567, 575 (Mass. 2007) ("[A] person has no duty to act affirmatively to protect
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either created the risk of harm or by virtue of the relationship of
the parties, which irrespective of the risk, creates a duty of care.15
Chapter 7 of the new Restatement takes a more straightforward
approach to affirmative duties than past Restatements. In the
First and Second Restatements, affirmative duties were broken
down into two subsets: (1) duties to control third persons, and (2)
duties based on the conduct of the actor.16 The Third Restatement
simplifies this approach, considering "only whether a duty
exists."' 7 In addition, as explained in the Scope Note to Chapter 7,
the chapter does not delve into "[w]hether that duty is breached,
whether the breach is a factual cause of physical harm, [or]
whether there is some basis on which the harm is beyond the
actor's scope of liability . . . ."18 The chapter is intended to cover

only where affirmative duties exist as a matter of law; a
determination that is made by state and federal courts applying
state law.19
Chapter 7 includes eight consecutively numbered sections. 20
This organizational scheme alone represents an improvement over
the Second Restatement, which requires cross-reference to other
Restatement topics that do not focus squarely on whether an
affirmative duty should exist as a matter of law. 21 Chapter 7
separates these topics in a clearer and more "user-friendly"
manner, which is likely due to the Reporter's decision to adopt a
more uniform approach to affirmative duties. 22

another from harm.").
15. E.g., Williams v. California, 664 P.2d 137, 145 (Cal. 1983) ("[T]he
existence of a special relationship between the parties will give rise to [an
affirmative] duty."); Downs v. Bush, 263 S.W.3d 812, 819 (Tenn. 2008)
("[TIndividuals have an obligation to refrain from acting in a way that creates
an unreasonable risk of harm to others. . . .").
16. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM ch. 7, scope note (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005).
17. Id.
18. Id. Answers to these issues can be found in Chapters 3-6 of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm,
which are published and final. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM (2005).
19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM ch. 7, scope note (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005); see id.
§ 38 cmt. b (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005) (stating "there is no general
federal common law").
20. Id. §§ 37-44.
21. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 319, 323 (1965)
(addressing, respectively, duty when one assumes control over the conduct of a
dangerous person and liability when one undertakes to render services to
another). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL
AND EMOTIONAL HARM ch. 7, scope note (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005)
(noting that Sections 319 and 323 of the Second Restatement result in
overlap).
22. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
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The first section of Chapter 7 of the Third Restatement,
Section 37, states the traditional American rule that no
affirmative duty exists where an actor's conduct "has not created a
risk of physical harm to another." 23 Stated plainly, there is no
general duty in tort law to rescue or protect another person from
injury. While the prior Restatements each include similar
language, 24 the Third Restatement eliminates any inquiry of
nonfeasance (that is, the failure to act) versus malfeasance (that
is, an openly hostile act), reasoning that "this distinction can be
misleading" under certain circumstances. 25 Instead, Section 37
focuses exclusively on whether a risk of harm is created to
determine the existence of a duty. 26 Section 37 further provides an
important caveat, which could be read to strengthen the new
Restatement's embodiment of American common law tradition: the
sole exceptions to the "no duty" rule are housed in the subsequent
sections of Chapter 7.27
Section 38, the first section to provide for an affirmative duty,
states, "When a statute requires an actor to act for the protection
of another, the court may rely on the statute to decide that an
affirmative duty exists and its scope." 28 This topic and black letter
rule is not addressed in either of the previous RestatementS29 and
represents new ground for the AL. The new rule invites a court to
read an affirmative duty into a statute or regulation where the
purpose or design of the statute is consistent with that duty.30 The
rule applies when the statute or regulation at issue does not
provide for or bar a private right of action; Section 38 is intended
EMOTIONAL HARM, ch. 7, scope note (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005) (stating
that Chapter 7 tries to eliminate a redundancy present in the First and
Second Restatements and avoids using sub-chapters).
23. Id. § 37 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005).
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965) ("The fact that the
actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for
another's aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take
such action."); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 314 (1934) ("The actor's realization
that action on his part is necessary for another's aid or protection does not of
itself impose upon him a duty to take such action.").
25. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 37 cmt. c (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005).
26. Id.
27. Id. § 37 (stating that there is no affirmative duty "unless a court
determines that one of the affirmative duties provided in §§ 38-44 is
applicable.").
28. Id. § 38.
29. See id. § 38 cmt. a (noting that "[t]he Restatement Second of Torts
§ 874A provided that statutes might play a role in the creation of new claims,"
but also that "Section 874A has not played any appreciable role in the
recognition of affirmative duties based on statutory provisions . . . .").
30. See id. § 38 cmt. e ("[W]hen a court finds that permitting tort actions
would be inconsistent with the statute's design or purpose, imposing a tort
duty is improper.").

The John Marshall Law Review

324

[44:319

to apply to areas where the law does not provide a clear
enforcement mechanism. 1 For example, in one of the illustrations
provided, a court would be permitted to recognize an affirmative
duty on the part of a landlord to repair locks based on a municipal
ordinance requiring landlords to provide working locks.32
The next section providing for an affirmative duty, Section 39,
returns to familiar Restatement territory. The black letter rule
restates and combines Sections 321 and 322 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts to provide that when an actor's prior conduct
creates a continuing risk of harm, the actor owes an affirmative
duty of reasonable care to minimize the harm.3 3 This is essentially
the inverse rule of Section 37, which provides that no duty exists
where a person does not create a risk of harm. 34 The key aspect of
the rule in Section 39 is that it applies regardless of whether the
conduct creating a risk of harm is tortious; the threshold inquiry
is, again, only whether a risk of harm is created.35 To illustrate the
point, Section 39 provides a nearly identical example to that of the
Second Restatement in which a golfer hitting a ball owes a duty of
care to an individual who suddenly appears in the ball's path and
is at increased risk of being struck. 36
The duty rule in Section 39 is somewhat duplicative of the
general duty of reasonable care provided for in the new
Restatement, a point the Reporters acknowledge, 37 yet a clear
distinction exists justifying separate treatment as an affirmative
duty. This occurs where an actor's prior conduct is not currently
creating the risk.38 An example provided is an automobile driver
who collides with another driver; regardless of the driver's
negligence, he or she has an affirmative duty to prevent further
harm to the other driver in the aftermath of the collision.39
31. See id. ("[Tort law can serve an enforcement role when the policy
reflected in the statute is important, and the statute does not contain
adequate enforcement provisions.").
32. Id. § 38 cmt. b, illus. 1.
33. Id. § 39 cmt. a.
34. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
35. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM, § 39 cmt. c (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005) ("The duty
imposed by this Section is justified by the actor's creating a risk (even if
nontortiously).

..

36. Compare id. at § 39 cmt. c, illus. 1 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005),
with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 321 cmt. a, illus. 1.
37. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM, § 39 cmt. d (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005) ("This
Section imposes a duty that might be subsumed under the general duty of
reasonable care in § 7.").
38. See id. ("[Tihis Section is most often invoked when an actor engages in a
discrete, nontortious act that creates a continuing risk of harm and causes
harm at a later time.").
39. Id.
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Section 40, similar to Section 39, sets forth another
traditional area of affirmative duties: a duty based upon a "special
relationship." 40 While the term "special relationship" carries no
independent significance,41 the law has developed to recognize a
select group of relationships between two or more parties as
requiring a duty of care where the traditional default "no duty"
rule would otherwise apply. 42 Section 40 finds its counterpart in
Section 314A of the Second Restatement and lists the same special
relationships: a common carrier and its passengers; an innkeeper
and its guests; a land possessor who lawfully holds its premises
open to the public and land entrants; and, if required by law, a
custodian and those in its custody.4 3
In addition to these traditional special relationships, Section
40 includes several other relationships as requiring a duty of
reasonable care. The first, derived from Section 314B of the Second
Restatement, 44 applies to the employer and employee relationship
where the employee is "in imminent danger" or "injured and
therefore helpless."45 Section 40 also adds two entirely new special
relationships: a school and its students and a landlord and its
tenants. 46 The final relationship added by the new Restatement
builds from the custodian relationship and recognizes an
affirmative duty where "the custodian has a superior ability to
protect the other."47
Each of these affirmative duties "requires only reasonable
care under the circumstances," which represents a more
generalized duty of care than that expressed in the previous
Restatement. 48 In addition, while the Second Restatement
"expresses no opinion as to whether there may not be other
[special] relations" giving rise to an affirmative duty, 49 the Third
40. Id. § 40.
41. Id. § 40 cmt. h.
42. See, e.g., Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 482
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (placing duty of care on landlord to take protective measures
to prevent criminal acts from being perpetrated against tenants); Baker v.
Fenneman & Brown Properties, LLC, 793 N.E.2d 1203, 1206-10 (Ind. 2003)
(finding that a restaurant owner owes an ill patron a duty of care);
Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist. No. 105-157-166J, 758 P.2d 968, 973 (Wash.
1988) (finding that a school district owes a duty of care to students engaged in
interscholastic sports).
43. RESTATEMENT

(THIRD)

OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL

AND

EMOTIONAL HARM §§ 40(b)(1), (2), (3), (7)(a) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005);
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A.
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314B.
45. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM, § 40(b)(4) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005).
46. See id. §§ 40(b)(5), (6).
47. Id. § 40(b)(7)(b).

48. Id. § 40 cmt. d.
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 314A caveat.
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Restatement takes the approach that "[t]he list of special
relationships provided in this Section is not exclusive."50 Rather,
the Third Restatement states that, in addition to the new special
relationships listed, courts are free to recognize others, and it even
suggests that "[o]ne likely candidate" is the relationship among
family members.5 1
Section 41 similarly addresses special relationships, but in
the case where the risk of harm by one in a special relationship is
to a third party. 52 A classic example, expressly provided for in the
black letter rule of Section 41, is the affirmative duty a parent has
to dependent children to prevent the child from harming others.5 3
Section 41 also includes the affirmative duty of a custodian to
control the conduct of those in its custody from risks of harm to
third parties, an employers' duty to control the conduct of its
employees from harming others, and a mental health
professional's duty to prevent harm to others caused by his or her
patients.5 4 These four scenarios are similarly represented in
Sections 316, 317, and 319 of the Second Restatement;55 Section
318, dealing with a duty of land possessors to control risks to third
parties,5 6 is addressed separately in Chapter 9 of the new
Restatement.57
Section 42 covers the creation of an affirmative duty of care to
reduce the risk of harm to another when one "undertakes to render

50. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 40 cmt. o (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005).
51. Id.
52. Id. § 41(a).
53. Id. § 41(b)(1).
54. Id. §§ 41(b)(2)-(4). In effect, Section 41(b)(4) adopts the approach taken
by the California Supreme Court in the seminal case, Tarasoff v. Regents of
the University of California,where the court recognized an affirmative duty on
the part of a psychiatrist to warn a third party when the patient threatened
imminent bodily harm. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 340
(Cal. 1976).
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 316, 317, 319 (discussing,
respectively, the duty of a parent to control conduct of his or her child, the
duty of a master to control the conduct of his or her servant, and the duty of
those in charge of a person exhibiting dangerous propensities).
56. Id. at § 318.
57. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 51 (Tentative Draft No. 6 2009) (defining the general duty
of care owed by a land possessor to entrants on the land). In Chapter 9, all
land possessors owe a duty of reasonable care to those who come on the
premises, except for the so-called "flagrant trespasser." See id. § 52(a) (stating
that the only duty owed by a land possessor to a flagrant trespasser is "the
duty not to act in an intentional, willful, or wanton manner to cause physical
harm."). This newly fashioned legal term finds no support in the case law of
any state and represents one of the more controversial provisions of the new
Restatement. See infra Section III.A.
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services to [the other]."58 While such an undertaking could include
rendering services to aid an imperiled person,59 Section 42 is
intended to apply more broadly.60 Under the black letter rule, an
actor who renders services to another owes an affirmative duty
when the actor fails to exercise reasonable care and either the
actor increases the risk of physical harm to the recipient of the
services, or the recipient reasonably relies on the actor's exercise of
reasonable care.61 For example, if a neighbor agreed to watch
another's pet when she is out of town and neglected to do so, the
caretaker neighbor would owe an affirmative duty under Section
42.62

Section 323 of the Second Restatement contains similar
language under the heading "Negligent Performance Of
Undertaking To Render Services."63 Section 42 of the new
Restatement incorporates these same concepts, but uses broader
language. For instance, where Section 323 of the Second
Restatement states the affirmative duty as one in which the actor
renders services to another "which he should recognize as
64
necessary for the protection of the other's person or things,"
Section 42 finds a duty whenever that actor renders services which
he "knows or should know" reduces the risk of harm.65 The duty in
Section 42 also applies regardless of any altruistic purpose on the
part of the rescuer. 66 In addition, while the Second Restatement
expresses no opinion on whether the making of a contract
constitutes an "undertaking" for the purposes of finding an
affirmative duty,6 7 Section 42 of the new Restatement broadly
defines an undertaking to include any voluntary rendering of
services, whether gratuitously, for consideration, or pursuant to a
contract or promise.68 Section 42 further provides that an
undertaking is not limited to services rendered on behalf of a
58. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 42 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005).

59. Section 44 more directly covers this situation. Id. § 44.
60. See id. § 42 cmt. a (noting that Section 42 applies to people undertaking
services both gratuitously and for consideration).
61. Id. § 42.
62. Id. § 42 cmt. f, illus. 3.
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323. Section 325 of the Second
Restatement, titled "Failure to Perform Gratuitous Undertaking to Render
Services," which similarly dealt with the affirmative duty created by
undertaking a rescue, was subsumed by Section 323. See id. § 325 (stating
that subject matter now covered by Section 323).
64. Id. § 323 (emphasis added).
65. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 42 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005).
66. Id.§ 42 cmt. d.
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 caveat 1.
68. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM §§ 42 cmt. d, cmt. e (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005).
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specific individual, but may include "a class of persons."6 9
Section 43 provides an important complement to the
affirmative duty rule of Section 42 by addressing the duty owed to
third persons while voluntarily rendering services in an
undertaking to reduce the risk of physical harm. Similar to the
previous section, the black letter rule of Section 43 provides that
an actor who renders services to another owes an affirmative duty
to a third person if the actor's failure to exercise reasonable care
exposes that third person to an increased risk of physical harm. 70
Additionally, the actor owes an affirmative duty of reasonable care
to a third party if the actor has undertaken to perform a duty owed
by the recipient of services to that third party, or the recipient of
services, the third party, or another relies on the actor exercising
reasonable care in the undertaking.7 1 An example would be a
community organization offering to clear snow and ice from the
sidewalk in front of a store and, following an ice storm, failing to
render this service. 72 If a third party slipped on the uncleared ice,
the community organization would owe an affirmative duty to that
third party because it undertook a duty owed by the store owner to
the third party.73
Generally speaking, Section 43 restates the rule provided in
Section 324A of the Second Restatement, but, as with Section 42,74
broadens the language and scope of the rule.75 Section 43, like the
Second Restatement, expresses no opinion on whether increased
risk or reliance is required in all cases.76 Section 43 later explains,
however, that when an actor undertakes a duty of another who
owes a duty to third parties, in effect "voluntarily stepping into the
shoes of another," there is no requirement of an increased risk of
physical harm or reliance to find a duty.77 Rather, this affirmative
duty is grounded in the preexisting duty of the actor whose duty
was voluntarily undertaken by someone else.78
Id. § 42 cmt. d.
Id. § 43(a).
Id. §§ 43(b), (c).
E.g., id. § 43 cmt. g, illus. 2.
Id.
See supra notes 58-69 and accompanying text.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM §§ 43 cmt. a, cmt. c (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005)
(noting that Section 43 replaces Section 324A of the Second Restatement, and
also "parallels [the new] § 42 but extends the duty that is owed to third
persons."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A cmt. a (noting
that Section 324A parallels Section 323 of the Second Restatement).
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

76. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY
EMOTIONAL HARM § 43 cmt. e (Proposed Final
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A caveat 1.
77. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY
EMOTIONAL HARM § 43 cmt g (Proposed Final Draft No.

FOR PHYSICAL

Draft No.

AND

1 2005);

FOR PHYSICAL

AND

1 2005).
78. See id. (stating that the mere act of "voluntarily stepping into the shoes
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The final section of Chapter 7, Section 44, covers the related
duty created when a person "takes charge of another," or as it is
more commonly referred to, attempts a rescue.79 This section
might more simply be described as the duty owed where an
"imperfect" rescue has been attempted. Similar to Sections 42 and
43, Section 44 is intended to apply to situations where a person
renders aid to another in peril and either the rescuer's failure to
exercise reasonable care increases the risk of harm or the injured
person's reliance on the rescuer to exercise reasonable care under
the circumstances results in physical harm. The black letter rule
provides simply that a duty of reasonable care is owed whenever a
person "takes charge" of another who reasonably appears to be
imperiled and unable to protect himself or herself.80 The rescuer's
duty lasts while the imperiled person is in the rescuer's care, and
when the rescuer discontinues aid or protection he or she has a
duty to refrain from putting the imperiled person in a "worse
position" than existed before the rescuer stepped in and took
charge.81
The rule provided in Section 44 represents the traditional
formulation of the "rescue doctrine." 82 Section 324 of the Second
Restatement provided a nearly identical rule.83 Section 44 differs
from Sections 42 and 43 in that Section 44 deals exclusively with
rescues and does not require reliance or an increased risk of
physical harm. 84 It does require, however, that an actor have the
purpose of benefitting the other, unlike Section 42.85 Thus, Section
of another who has a preexisting duty justifies imposing the duty on the
actor.").
79. Id. § 44.
80. Id. § 44(a).
81. Id. § 44(b).
82. See Peter F. Lake, Recognizing the Importance of Remoteness to the
Duty of Rescue, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 315, 331 (1997) (describing an exception to
the general no duty rule as, "Mhe defendant ... begins a rescue and does it
amiss."); Philip W. Romohr, A Right/Duty Perspective on the Legal and
Philosophical Foundationsof the No-Duty-to-Rescue Rule, 55 DUKE L.J. 1025,
1032 (2006) ("One who has no duty to rescue a person in peril, yet undertakes
a rescue of that person, becomes bound to exercise reasonable care in the
rescue attempt."); Marin Roger Scordato, Understandingthe Absence of a Duty
to Reasonably Rescue in American Tort Law, 82 TuL. L. REV. 1447, 1461-62
(2008) (noting that an exception to "the general no-duty-to-rescue rule is
triggered by the defendant voluntarily rendering aid to the plaintiff.").
83. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 (providing that "[o]ne who,
being under no duty to do so, takes charge of another who is helpless" owes a
duty to "exercise reasonable care to secure the safety of the other" and not
leave the party in a "worse position").
84. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 44 cmt. a (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005) (noting that
Section 44's predecessor in the Second Restatement, Section 324, did not
require reliance or an increased risk of physical harm).
85. Id. § 44 cmt. c.
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44 is a more narrow exception to the general default "no duty"
rule. 86
Under the Third Restatement, the foregoing exceptions in
Sections 38 through 44 represent the exclusive set of
circumstances in which an affirmative duty arises. While in many
respects these duties pattern the Second Restatement, they are, by
design, considerably broader in scope. Some of these reformulated
rules also add ambiguous language which, if adopted, may present
significant new litigation issues, and as the next section discusses,
could lead to unprecedented expansions of liability.
II. AVENUES TO MUDDY TRADITIONAL LIMITS OF
AFFIRMATIVE DUTIES

Embedded in Chapter 7's restatement of affirmative duties
are two areas in particular that propose broad expansion of
liability against civil defendants. They are found in Sections 38,
42, and 43, which collectively cover a wide range of relationships
and risks of harm. These liability-enhancing provisions do not,
however, implicate the most sacrosanct and uniform rules of
affirmative duty, such as the duty owed when attempting a rescue,
nor do they represent a direct assault on the general "no duty"
rule. Instead, these changes are more furtive, affecting rules and
interpretations that are less indomitable and understood, yet
nevertheless can have equally profound liability effects. As a
result, the new Restatement is poised to dilute the well-formed
limits of affirmative duties and to call upon courts to revisit
traditional duty rules.
A. Affirmative Duty Based on Statute
By far the most open and dramatic change in Chapter 7 is
Section 38. This section is, again, entirely new, addressing an
issue of statutory interpretation in which the previous
Restatements did not encompass. The black letter rule begins
innocuously enough by stating that a court may rely on a statute
requiring an actor to protect another to determine that an
affirmative common law duty exists.87 The rule further provides
that the court shall determine the scope of the newly minted duty
it recognizes under the statute.8 8 In lacking any additional
refinement, this black letter rule presents both a highly
ambiguous and remarkable proposition for courts; judges are
empowered to recognize affirmative duties where they have never
before existed and where there is no case law or other authority to
86. See id. (noting that the duty
purpose.").

87. Id. § 38.
88. Id.

in Section 44

is "limited in scope and
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support them.
Even a non-lawyer can appreciate the potential confusion and
chaos that could develop from such a broad legal rule. A court, for
example, could read a common law affirmative duty into almost
any law related to protective services, custody, control, or
oversight authority. Furthermore, a court could do so while acting
within the spirit of the rule, even if such action was not the actual
intent of the legislature in enacting the law. All that is needed is a
law that can plausibly be interpreted as requiring an actor to act
for the protection of another.
The comments to Section 38, rather than providing an
important restraint on judicial activism, literally invite courts to
create new affirmative duties at common law. Comment c
provides: "When the legislature has not provided a remedy, but the
interest protected is physical harm, courts may consider the
legislative purpose and the values reflected in the statute to decide
that the purpose and values justify adopting a duty that the
common law had not previously recognized."89 The comments go on
to explain the significance of such a judicial determination:
"Employing a statute to provide a tort duty where none previously
existed creates a new basis for liability not previously recognized
by tort law."90
In addition, the comments clearly envision a broad range of
law in which the "values reflected in the statute" can trigger a new
common law tort duty, and accordingly, tort liability.9 1 Section 38
is intended to apply to state and federal statutes, any regulations
promulgated by state and federal agencies, and even ordinances or
other laws adopted by municipalities and local governments. 92
Indeed, the Restatement does not appear to foreclose the
possibility of any form of law creating a state common law tort
duty.
With regard to the use of a federal law to create a state tort
law affirmative duty-a proposition with profound implications for
Restatement justifies its
federalism and state rights 9 3-the
to a court determining
is
"analogous
approach by stating that it
negligence per se
constitutes
provision
that a violation of a federal
94 This is not a very accurate
state
law."
in a tort case governed by
89. Id. § 38 cmt. c.
90. Id. § 38 cmt. d.
91. Id. § 38 cmt. c.
92. Id. § 38 cmt. b.
93. See City of Milwaukee v. minois, 451 U.S. 304, 313 (1981) ('The
enactment of a federal rule in an area of national concern, and the decision of
whether to displace state law in doing so, is generally not made by the federal
judiciary, purposefully insulated from democratic pressures, but by the people
through their elected representatives in Congress.").
94. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 38 cmt. b (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005).
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or effective analogy because such a violation would only provide
evidence of negligence (that is, the breach of an existing duty of
care) that satisfies the burden of proof; it is entirely distinct from a
court creating a new duty that could be violated. The Restatement
does not appear to consider the potential for federal provisions to
supplant state tort law in significant ways.95 The comments to
Section 38 provide that federal law is fair game so long as it does
not preempt state tort law liability;9 6 the result is that federal law
requiring the protection of another will either trump state tort law
through preemption or, alternatively, trump state tort law by
imposing a new common law duty. Thus, Section 38 threatens to
significantly expand the scope and impact of federal law, and in
ways that may be contrary to both existing state common law duty
rules and the will of Congress.
In addition to the boundless array of law that Section 38
invites courts to turn into new tort claims, Section 38 provides no
effective standards or criteria to guide courts in determining which
laws should give rise to an affirmative duty. The black letter rule
of Section 38 provides only the ambiguous consideration of
whether a law requires an actor to act for the protection of
another.97 The comments and illustrations suffer from similar
vagueness. In fact, in examining case law, the Reporters' readily
acknowledge that "it is difficult to discern any specific rule that
emerges."98 The principal inquiry for courts to make in applying
Section 38 is whether an affirmative duty is consistent with the
legislative purpose of a law requiring an actor to act for the
protection of another. Alternatively, the comments instruct that
"when a court finds that permitting tort actions would be
inconsistent with the statute's design or purpose, imposing a tort
duty is improper";99 hardly a model of clarity for courts seeking to
reach predictable and fair outcomes.
The remaining, equally ambiguous, inquiry is whether the
law at issue either provides for or bars a private right of action.100
Section 38 is designed to operate in the "interstices" of these
opposing areas where the precise enforcement of the law is
vague. 0 1 The rationale appears to be that if a private right of
95. The Reporters' Note for Section 38, however, does cite two cases that
address this concern: Marquay v. Eno, 662 A.2d 272, 277 (N.H. 1995); and
Cuyler v. United States, 362 F.3d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 2004). RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 38
reporters' note, cmt. c (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005).
96. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 38 cmt. b (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005).
97. Id. § 38.
98. Id. § 38 cmt. e.
99. Id.
100. Id. § 38 cmt. c.
101. Id.
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action already exists, there is no need to determine whether an
affirmative duty exists that could give rise to similar tort liability,
and if a private right of action is expressly barred, an affirmative
duty could not be consistent with the law.102 The challenge for
courts is determining the existence of a private right of action in
the absence of express language. This separate "implied cause of
action" inquiry similarly examines the legislative purpose and
intent of the law; an analysis which suffers from comparable
ambiguity and inconsistency.10 3 Hence, to summarize, Section 38
applies an amorphous standard for where a law is "consistent
with" an affirmative duty to a law that, by definition, is
amorphous and vague as to its enforcement.
The illustrations to Section 38 further provide only minimal
guidance for courts. Two examples of Section 38's potential
application are provided, and they may actually serve to increase
judicial confusion. The first illustration, mentioned previously,
involves the landlord tenant relationship,104 which is already
regarded as one of the new "special relationships" giving rise to an
102. See id. (stating that, without an express provision for or prohibition of a
duty, courts should be free to adopt one that is consistent with the "purpose
and values reflected in the statute").
103. The course taken by courts in finding implied rights of action has been
far from clear. Initially, the United States Supreme Court, in Cort v. Ash,
developed a vague and subjective four-factor test to determine the availability
of private claims from a statute: (1) the plaintiff is a member of the class for
whom the statute was enacted; (2) there is an indication of legislative intent to
create or deny an implied remedy; (3) a private cause of action is consistent
with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme; and (4) the cause of
action is one traditionally relegated to state law. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78
(1975). The Court later moved away from this test, however, instead
concentrating solely on congressional intent. E.g., Transamerica Mortg.
Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 23-24 (1979) (noting that the four factors
of Cort did not carry equal weight; rather, "[t]he central inquiry remains
whether Congress intended to create . . . a private cause of action." (quoting
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979)); see also Susan
J. Stabile, The Role of Congressional Intent in Determining the Existence of
Implied Private Rights of Action, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 861, 869-70 (1996)
(noting that the Supreme Court, as well as most lower federal courts, focus on
congressional intent in ascertaining whether a private right of action is
implied in a statute); but see Michael A. Mazzuchi, Note, Section 1983 and
Implied Rights of Action: Rights, Remedies, and Realism, 90 MICH. L. REV.
1062, 1093 (1992) (noting that the first Cort factor persists in the context of
implied rights of action under Section 1983). State courts, however, possess
much broader authority to find private rights of action in federal statutes,
limited only by the doctrine of preemption. Pauline E. Calande, Comment,
State Incorporation of Federal Law: A Response to the Demise of Implied
Federal Rights of Action, 94 YALE L.J. 1144, 1162-63 (1985). State courts have
been similarly unpredictable in finding the existence or prohibition of private
rights of action in federal law. John H. Bauman, Note, Implied Causes of
Action in the State Courts, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1243, 1244 (1978).
104. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM §§ 38 cmt. c, illus. 1 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005).
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affirmative duty under another section of Chapter 7.105 The facts
are that the landlord fails to fix a broken lock on the rear door of a
tenant's apartment despite several repair requests by the
tenant.106 A burglar later breaks in, stealing the tenant's
property. 107 A municipal ordinance requires landlords to provide
and maintain locks, but is silent about private rights.10 8 According
to the new Restatement, a court "should take the ordinance into
account" in determining whether the landlord owes the tenant a
common law duty to maintain the locks. 09 The illustration does
not state that the court should or should not recognize an
affirmative duty, but only that the ordinance is something to think
about. Again, the guidance to courts is unclear, as is any standard
to apply.
Section 38's second illustration provides a slightly more
definitive conclusion, but one that raises the question of how and
why the outcome is any different or less ambiguous. In this
example, a statute requiring public schools to test for scoliosis is
held not to create a common law affirmative duty, in effect denying
a student delayed in her scoliosis diagnoses the ability sue the
school under common law.110 The only additional facts provided
are that a provision in the statute states that the legislature
"sought to minimize the expense incurred by school districts,
including school districts that did not comply with their statutory
obligations."' The illustration states that this expression of the
legislature's desire to preserve school districts' financial resources
"counsels against the court finding that [the school district] had an
affirmative duty . . . ."112 No further analysis is provided as to why
this expression of a tangential legislative goal proves outcome
determinative with respect to recognizing an affirmative duty.
Equally as disconcerting as the lack of clear standards for
courts to apply such a broad new rule is the lack of legal authority
supporting the rule. While the comments submit that courts
"regularly confront" the role of statutes in providing an affirmative
duty,1"3 there is comparatively little discussion on how courts
traditionally approach this analysis or how common it is for a new
duty to be recognized in the common law from a statute. The
Reporters' Note for Section 38 merely states, "Courts frequently
have not made a clear distinction between implied rights of action

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. § 40(b)(6).
Id. § 38 cmt. c, illus. 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 38 cmt. c, illus. 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 38 cmt. a.
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and statutorily supported tort duties," 114 which does not validate
the rule of Section 38. Recognizing an implied private right of
action involves a separate statutory analysis of whether the
legislature, in enacting the statute, intended to confer a private
action.1 15 That courts often do not distinguish an implied right of
action and the creation of a statutorily supported common law tort
duty makes sense because they are separate doctrines; a court
would have little reason to do so. This would appear to undercut
much of the case law cited in the Reporters' Note to support
Section 38's black letter rule. For example, Illustration 2,
discussed above, is based on a case in which the court determined
that an implied private cause of action existed, not an affirmative
duty.116 The case on which Illustration 1-the only other rule
example provided-is based also did not support the finding of a
common law tort duty.'
Stated simply, there is a clear dearth of case law supporting
recognition of a new common law tort duty based upon a statute.
The vast majority of cases cited in the Reporters' Note either deal
with statutory, not common law, duties,1 18 or examine allegedly
analogous situations that are also not directly on point.119
Nevertheless, in one of the cases cited in the Reporters' Note that
is directly on point, Cuyler v. United States, the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit expressly rejected the notion that a
statutory obligation could provide the basis for a tort duty that did
not exist under the common law. 120 The decision, authored by
Judge Richard Posner, held that Illinois' Abused and Neglected
Child Reporting Act did not create a common law tort duty on the
part of hospital personnel to report suspected abuse of a child by
his babysitter.121 The court reasoned that if it were to recognize
such a tort duty, "every statute that specified a standard of care
would be automatically enforceable by tort suits for damagesevery statute in effect would create an implied private right of

114. Id. § 38 reporters' note, cmt. c.
115. See supra note 103.
116. Uhr v. E. Greenbush Cent. Sch. Dist., 720 N.E.2d 886, 891 (N.Y. 1999).
117. See Brock v. Watts Realty Co., 582 So. 2d 438, 441 (Ala. 1991) (finding a
statutory duty for a landlord to provide working locks, but not addressing
whether statute gave rise to a duty at common law).
118. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (holding that
Title VI does not create a private right of action to enforce regulations
promulgated pursuant to the statute); Worley v. Weigels, Inc., 919 S.W. 589,
593-94 (Tenn. 1996) (interpreting state statute to find that seller of alcohol is
not liable for injuries caused by an intoxicated underage driver).
119. See, e.g., Ashburn v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 510 A.2d 1078, 1085 (Md.
1986) (holding that no "special relationship" existed between defendant police
officer and the plaintiff victim).
120. Cuyler, 362 F.3d at 952.
121. Id. at 951-52.
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action-which clearly is not the law." 122
The same reasoning applies to Section 38. Laws that require
an actor to act for the protection of another or specify a standard of
care in providing protection could be transformed into significant
new common law tort duties. Section 38 specifically points to laws
providing for the reporting of child abuse and other crimes as
"fertile ground" for this new exception to the traditional "no duty"
rule to take root. 123 But the potential effect of the rule is far more
sweeping; a point punctuated by the total lack of judicially
manageable standards and case law support to apply the rule. 124
Courts debating whether to adopt Section 38 should consider these
issues before opening the door to what the Restatement even
admits is new and "controversial" tort liability.125
Finally, courts should appreciate the Russian-roulette power
of Section 38. It gives plaintiffs' lawyers an unfair weapon to force
settlements. Plaintiffs' lawyers will understand that a defendant
who fails to settle a case risks not only a potential loss in that
specific case, but the threat that a court under Section 38 will
create a whole new unprecedented way to sue that could adversely
affect the defendant in a myriad of litigation in the future. In that
regard, it is not surprising that Restatement Reporter Michael
Green and former ATLA President Larry Stewart prominently
referred to Section 38 in their list of plaintiffs' lawyers "Top Ten
Tools" in the new Restatement.126 Courts should reject Section 38
and leave the creation of new ways to sue under statutes to the
appropriate branch of government: the legislature. Unlike courts,
the legislature can make such new laws prospective and consider
all points of societal views, not just the inquiry of plaintiffs'
lawyers seeking a new way to sue.
B. Affirmative Duty Based on Risk Reduction "Undertaking"
A second major change in the new Restatement, one that is
more subtle than Section 38, is the treatment of an "undertaking"
to reduce a risk of physical harm and establish an affirmative duty
of care, which is found in Sections 42 and 43. Again, these sections
involve an actor's failure to exercise reasonable care in an
undertaking, the result of which increases the risk of harm to the

122. Id. at 952.
123. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 38 reporters' note, cmt. e (Proposed Final Draft No. 1
2005).
124. See supra notes 118-119 and accompanying text.
125. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 38 reporters' note, cmt. e (Proposed Final Draft No. 1
2005).
126. Green & Stewart, supra note 1, at 47.
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intended beneficiary of the undertaking or other third parties. 127
An affirmative duty may also be imposed under these sections
where an undertaking's intended beneficiary or a third party relies
on the actor exercising reasonable care to reduce the risk of a
given harm. 128 On the surface, these black letter rules appear to
track their counterparts in the Second Restatement; however, the
comments and Reporters' Note suggest a significantly expanded
view of this affirmative duty that gives rise to tort liability.
The most significant change from the prior Restatement is the
"threshold for an undertaking," which translates to the type of
affirmative conduct that will give rise to an affirmative duty. 129
Section 42 of the new Restatement enlarges the scope of what
conduct constitutes an undertaking to include any voluntary
rendering of services.130 Specifically, the comments to Section 42
recognize any contract or promise to act to reduce the risk of
physical harm to another as sufficient to establish an
"undertaking."131 In contrast, Section 323 of the Second
Restatement, which the Third Restatement acknowledges has
been "widely accepted" and applied by "[njearly every
jurisdiction,"132 includes the explicit caveat that the ALI takes no
position on whether a contract or a promise to act to reduce risk to
another should be considered an undertaking giving rise to an
affirmative duty. 133
At first blush, the decision to include contracts and promises
as sufficient to trigger an affirmative duty of care may not seem
very dramatic. After all, as the comments to Section 42 analogize,
contract law has long provided a recovery for "mere promises."134
The potential application in tort law, however, is very different, 3 5
and, if adopted, would likely to lead to liability in situations in
which a duty has never before been recognized. At the same time,
the restated rule proposes to frustrate the drafting and entering of
127. See supra notes 58-78 and accompanying text.
128. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 42(b) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005).
129. Id. § 42 cmt. d.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. § 42 reporters' note, cmt. a.
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 caveat 1. Section 325 of the
Second Restatement, titled "Failure To Perform Gratituious Undertaking To
Render Services," did address in greater detail a promise as an undertaking,
but this section was omitted and subsumed by Section 323. Id. § 325.
134. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 42 cmt. e (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005).
135. See eToll, Inc. v. Elias/Savion Advertising, Inc., 811 A.2d 10, 14 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2002) ("Tort actions lie for breaches of duties imposed by law as a
matter of social policy, while contract actions lie only for breaches of duties
imposed by mutual consensus agreements between particular individuals ...
." (quoting Bash v. Bell Tel. Co., 601 A.2d 825, 829 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)).
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certain types of contracts. For example, many businesses contract
with independent contractors for the principal reason of limiting
their potential liability, including tort liability.8 6 If such a
contract could be used to support an affirmative duty to render aid
to the independent contractor or reduce its risk of harm, an
essential purpose for entering the contract would be removed.
Similarly, most individuals routinely contract for services,
such as cleaning the gutters on one's home. If such a service
contract provided for a "safe work environment," a court applying
Section 42 could impose an affirmative duty of care on the
homeowner if the contracted worker slipped and fell off of the roof.
While the new Restatement might additionally provide for an
affirmative duty in such a hypothetical by virtue of the
employer/employee relationship, 3 7 this separate avenue could be
employed to find a duty in similar contractual relationships that
do not implicate any "special relationship."
An additional consideration not addressed in the new
Restatement is the intersection of implied contracts. Sections 42
and 43 use the term "contract" generally and do not appear to
require a written, or even express, contract. The fact that these
sections are designed for greater inclusiveness and specifically
incorporate promises, which are also typically not reduced to
writing, suggests that all contracts are fair game to rely upon to
recognize an affirmative duty. As a result, courts would appear to
be equipped with broad latitude to find a duty to act to reduce
harm in new areas based upon almost any existing relationship in
which a service is provided because a contract would either be
express or implied.
The Restatement adds to this universe of agreements by
recognizing that an affirmative duty may be found pursuant to any
promise to reduce physical harm. 8s Like contracts, a promise
without any other affirmative conduct is considered an
undertaking under the new Restatement.139 Because promises are
commonly made in society, the inclusion of promises, as a practical
matter, raises numerous new duty questions. This is compounded
by the vagueness and imprecision of many promises, some of
136. See, e.g., Linda S. Calvert Hanson, Employers Beware! Negligence in the
Selection of an Independent Contractor Can Subject You to Legal Liability, 5
U. MIAMI Bus. L.J. 129, 155 (1995) (advising employers to thoroughly prescreen independent contractors to avoid any possible liability for torts
committed by that independent contractor); Ellen S. Pryor, Peculiar Risk in
American Tort Law, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 393, 416 (2011) (noting that independent
contractors serve a "cost-spreading" function for employers, providing
potential plaintiffs another party to sue).
137. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 40(b)(4) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005).
138. Id. § 42 cmt. e.
139. See id.
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which may now give way to tort liability if jurisdictions choose to
adopt Sections 42 and 43.
For example, spouses routinely promise to "love and provide
care" for one another; does such a promise constitute an
undertaking and impose an affirmative duty to reduce a risk of
physical harm? A plain reading of the black letter rule and
comments of Section 42 suggests that it could. The only remaining
criteria are that the spouse acted with knowledge that the promise
or vow (that is, undertaking) serves to reduce a risk of harm to the
other spouse, or that the other spouse relied upon the promise. 140
Such reliance by one spouse may very well be satisfied, meaning
that spouses would effectively owe each other a duty akin to a
"special relationship" and be able to sue one another following any
injury (for example, sickness, slip and fall, car accident) in which
one spouse fails to exercise reasonable care under the
circumstances.
Another example of the broad formulation of undertaking can
be seen in the safety reduction efforts of many businesses, such as
where a company promises to the public or other group of nonemployees to reduce a risk of harm, and then fails to do so. For
instance, if a utility company promised to implement safety
features to reduce risks to the public in the event of an accident,
and failed to exercise reasonable care in implementing those
features, the result of which was an increased risk of physical
harm, it could, under Section 42, be subject to tort liability.
Importantly, this would be the case regardless of whether an
accident occurs; the Restatement looks only to whether there is an
increased risk of harm from the undertaking. 141 Moreover, Section
42 does not distinguish between misfeasance and nonfeasance, 142
so failing to follow through on a promise to reduce a risk of
physical harm, for example, by missing a voluntarily stated
implementation deadline, is no different from negligent
performance of the risk-reducing task.
Similarly, if a pharmaceutical company established a safety
and education program asking consumers to report any adverse
drug side effects, it would appear to at least raise the
"undertaking" issue. If consumers relied upon such a safety
program, would that company then owe an affirmative duty to any
reporting consumer? Would the company be responsible for
immediately alleviating any harm from an alleged side effect
endured by the reporting consumer?
A related area of great practical concern arises when a trade
association sponsors programs designed to promote safety and

140. Id. § 42.
141. Id. § 42(a).
142. Id. § 42 cmt. c.
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well-being of the public. For example, if a trade association set
forth a new safety program to encourage persons to keep their
tires properly inflated, would it then owe an affirmative duty for
undertaking to reduce a risk of physical harm? Courts in states
adopting Sections 42 and 43 of the new Restatement would likely
be inundated with such questions; they might not all reach the
same conclusions. 143 At the very least, the threat of such new tort
liability will make companies and trade associations reconsider
programs and initiatives aimed at reducing risks of harm to the
public and others to whom no affirmative duty is traditionally
owed.
The critical liability and public policy issues implicated by the
expanded scope of an undertaking under Sections 42 and 43 also
do not end there. Another area with profound implications-and
an area that the Restatement directly addresses-is where an
insurer or other outside party conducts a safety evaluation to
assess the risk of harm at a facility or other location.144 On the one
hand, the insurer voluntarily renders services that reduce the risk
of physical harm to others, which could be interpreted as
technically satisfying the new Restatement's rule. But on the
other, the service, at least in the case of insurers, is the product of
a business activity to properly value risk to competitively price
insurance and limit business costs. To recognize an affirmative
duty would be akin to authorizing tort liability where it does not
exist for other companies based merely on the type of business
being operated.
The comments to Section 42 expressly state that an
affirmative duty should be imposed on an insurer or other party if
it "engages in loss-prevention activities" or in any way
communicates safety recommendations to others. 145 Put another
way, if an insurer or other entity conducts a safety evaluation for
the strict purpose of its business, it may not share its findings with
others without opening itself up to new tort liability. In effect, the
rule provided by Section 42 encourages insurers and other parties
to closely guard information that could reduce risks of physical
harm to others. This Restatement rule, therefore, could frustrate
the free exchange of safety information, and ultimately increase
risks of physical harm.
A similar situation also discussed in the Reporters' Note to
Section 42 is where an employer, insurer, or other party provides
143. Cf. Bauman, supra note 103, at 1244 (discussing the inconsistencies of
state courts in finding the existence or prohibition of private rights of action in
federal law).
144. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 42 reporters' note, cmt. d (Proposed Final Draft No. 1
2005).
145. Id.
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medical diagnoses or other medical services to another with the
purpose of limiting liability, and not necessarily providing a
benefit to the recipient of the services. 146 For example, if an
employer sponsored health screenings for the sole purpose of
demonstrating to shareholders the low risk of future occupational
disease at a facility, that employer could expose itself to tort
liability for any negligent screenings. Similarly, if an independent
research group conducted medical diagnoses of employees at a
plant for early detection of an occupational disease or illness for
the purposes of an academic study, those researchers could be
liable as well.
Two further considerations also compound the broad range of
concerns created by the new Restatement's undertaking rule. The
first is that Section 42 suggests that attempts by employers,
insurers, or other parties to disclaim or otherwise limit their tort
liability for their undertakings, a byproduct of which is reducing
the risks of harm to others, are insufficient to actually do so. The
Reporters' Note provides:
Statements denying an undertaking or about the limited purpose of
the inspection must be read skeptically as they are not provisions
that are bargained for by adversaries acting at arm's length and
often are inserted only to diminish potential liability to third parties
who are not parties to the contract. These provisions may, however,
bear on reliance by the other, but they do not negate, by themselves,
the existence of an undertaking. 147
By rejecting disclaimers of an undertaking for the purposes of
finding an affirmative duty, the new Restatement moves the
inquiry to how such disclaimers "bear on reliance." Here, an
additional consideration from a plain reading of the black letter
rules of Sections 42 and 43 with regard to reliance is particularly
revealing; the rules require reliance, but not reasonable reliance.
Accordingly, it would not appear to matter whether the person
reading a disclaimer of an undertaking should reasonably be
expected to have relied upon it. Rather, all a potential plaintiff
would need to say is that he or she did not rely on the disclaimer
for it to be regarded as completely ineffective.
As a practical matter, the ease with which a disclaimer of an
undertaking can be invalidated under the new Restatement
substantially limits its value. The predictable result for many
employers, insurers, and other parties (for example, researchers)
is that instead of trying to disclaim an undertaking that reduces a
risk of physical harm to others, these entities will simply opt not to

146. See id. § 42 reporters' note, cmt. f (noting that "[c]ourts have
inconsistently approached cases brought by employment or insurance
applicants against the physician who conducted the employment physical.").
147. Id. § 42 reporters' note, cmt. d.
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expose themselves to the risk of tort liability at all. Consequently,
avenues for risk reduction, especially in the workplace where the
risks of harm are often greatest, 148 would be curtailed in
jurisdictions adopting sections 42 and 43 of the new Restatement.
Moreover, the new Restatement takes the rule of duty
through undertaking in precisely the wrong direction. Public
policy should encourage undertakings that help promote public
safety and education, and not chill such action through an
expansion of duty in tort law. If the Restatement Reporters needed
an example of how such expansion of duties can lead to unsound
results, they could look at what occurred in the medical profession.
There, the fear of liability made many doctors afraid to
"undertake" responsibility and help a non-patient. 149 State
legislatures enacted "Good Samaritan" statutes in almost every
state so doctors would be encouraged to rescue without fear of
liability.1 50 Will it now be necessary to expand such statutes to
cover insurers, employers, corporations, research organizations,
and trade associations? Courts understanding of these
implications should reject these new expansions of duty based on
undertakings, avoiding the need for such measures.
III. PUBLIC POLICY CONSEQUENCES OF EXPANDING
AFFIRMATIVE DUTIES

Jurisdictions contemplating wholesale adoption of Chapter 7
of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and
Emotional Harm face a difficult choice. The new Restatement
offers a newer, more streamlined approach to affirmative duties,
but one that increases both the types of relationships giving rise to
an affirmative duty and the scope of such duties. Some of these
affirmative duties, such as the newly endorsed special relationship
between a school and its students, 151 are not highly controversial
and reflect logical development from the Second Restatement,
which provides for affirmative duties in analogous custodial
relationships. 152 Other duties, such as those discussed in the
previous section, represent substantially new, unexplored, and

148. See generally Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Effective
Communication of Warnings in the Workplace: Avoiding Injuries in Working
with Industrial Materials, 73 Mo. L. REV. 1 (2008).
149. See Stewart R. Reuter, Physicians As Good Samaritans, 20 J. LEGAL
MED. 157, 158 (1999) (noting that doctors feared liability as well as the costs of
litigation prior to Good Samaritan statutes' enactment).
150. E.g., id. at 157 (noting that all states and the District of Columbia have
Good Samaritan statutes, with some even having multiple "to give additional
categories of potential Good Samaritan immunity").
151. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 40(b)(5) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005).
152. Id. § 40 cmt. 1.
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controversial territory. 5 3 Not surprisingly, these new areas lack
the level of case law support that other Restatements, with some
notable exceptions, 154 have traditionally relied. This consideration
of relatively weak or even nonexistent case support is especially
telling where more than forty years have passed since the prior
Restatement's adoption by the ALL. Ultimately, however, the
decision to adopt any or all of Chapter 7 should come down to
whether the new rules and guidance represent sound, balanced
public policy.
A. GradualEliminationof the "No Duty" Rule
Beginning with a view of the forest, the new Restatement can
be read as endorsing a unified duty of reasonable care under
almost any circumstance.155 This duty rule can and has co-existed
with the traditional rule requiring no duty to act affirmatively for
the benefit of another.15 6 Nevertheless, the exceptions in Chapter 7
present very real potential for swallowing the "no duty" rule.
Section 38's broad authorization of courts to find affirmative
duties in any type of law or regulation, and with no discernable
criteria or standard for making such a determination, threatens on
its own to dramatically change how affirmative duties apply in
American law. The reformulation of an "undertaking" under
Sections 42 and 43 opens the door to potential liability for virtually
any affirmative conduct that happens to reduce another's risk of
harm or suggests harm reduction. Even Section 40, which literally
invites courts to recognize new "special relationships" beyond the
long-standing, finite list of such relationships, poses to
significantly upset traditional duty rules and inject uncertainty
into many commonly shared relationships between two or more
people. 157 Taken together, courts are equipped with unprecedented
ability to recognize new affirmative duties where no case law or
other authority has suggested a duty might exist.
When viewed comprehensively, the true, radical nature of
Chapter 7 of the new Restatement can be fully understood and
appreciated. Chapter 7 offers courts authority to create tort
liability in new ways, based on limited or nonexistent standards,
and largely unbounded by judicial precedents. Judges are left
primarily with their subjective views to guide them; a result that
153. See supra Section II.B.
154. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A. Section 402A, which
provides for strict products liability, had comparatively little case law support
at the time of its adoption, yet over the last forty years has become part of the
law of virtually every jurisdiction. See Schwartz, supra note 8, at 746-48.
155. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 (stating the general duty of reasonable care to others).
156. See sources cited supra note 82 (discussing general "no duty" rule).
157. See supra notes 40-51 and accompanying text.
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promotes volatility as opposed to the uniformity in the law that is
a traditional goal of Restatement projects. While many judges
would rightly reject the invitation to reshape state tort law in their
image and unfairly surprise defendants with new, unforeseen tort
liability, others might jump at the opportunity. They would likely
be accommodated by plaintiffs' lawyers eager to explain how a
statute or regulation could be interpreted to impose a new tort
duty, or how some action by a defendant functioned to reduce a
risk of physical harm and satisfied a duty-creating undertaking.
But even judges with such disposition can recognize that these
expansions of duty are not in the traditional mode of objective
Restatements. Reporter Professor Michael Green and former
ATLA President Larry Stewart have made that clear in their
article about the new Restatement's "Top Ten Tools" to help
plaintiffs' lawyers.15 8
The volume of statutes and regulations, and conduct that
individuals and businesses regularly engage in that could be said
to reduce risk of harm to another, or signal an intent to reduce
such a risk, create a new universe of sources of tort duties giving
rise to liability. As explained previously, Section 38 of the new
Restatement states that any law is fair game, and Sections 42 and
43 include any contract or mere promise as a sufficient harmreducing undertaking. The effect of this expanded universe,
combined with the newly restated general duty of reasonable care
to everyone and the other traditional affirmative duties of Chapter
7, is that there is increasingly limited area where a duty is not
owed by someone where a physical injury occurs.
For example, even some of the classic and inviolable "no duty"
scenarios of American law would no longer remain if states were to
adopt the new Restatement. Although not the focus of this Article,
one of the most controversial is the duty to trespassers, which
appears in Chapter 9 of the new Restatement. 5 9 This duty is
included among the affirmative duty sections of the Second
Restatement,160 but was amputated and given separate treatment
in the new Restatement. 16 1 The Second Restatement and the law
of the vast majority of states provide that a premises owner owes
no affirmative duty to a trespasser who has invaded the property
without express or implied permission.162 The public policy
158. See generally Green & Stewart, supra note 1.
159. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, The Status of Trespassers on Land, 44
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1071, 1078 (2009) (criticizing the new trespass rules for
basing liability on the extent of a trespasser's invasion of the possessor's right
to exclusive possession).
160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A(3).
161. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM ch. 9 (Tentative Draft No. 6 2009).
162. The Second Restatement incorporates this rule by stating that an
affirmative duty is owed where the premises owner opens the property to the
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supporting this rule is that an owner should be entitled to the free
use of the private property and should not bear responsibility or
liability for injuries to those who would ignore such privacy
interests, enter without authority, and proceed to injure
themselves as a result.1 63 The "no duty" rule discourages trespass
and promotes personal responsibility; interests that would be
severely undermined if an injured trespasser could later hold the
property owner liable for any injuries.
Chapter 9 of the new Restatement, however, severely curbs
this traditional rule, requiring a duty of reasonable care to all
"flagrant
defined
amorphously
the
except
trespassers
164 The term "flagrant trespasser" does not appear
trespasser."
anywhere in the law, contravening the traditional requirement
that black letter Restatement rules be supported by at least some
case law.165 It appears to cover a very narrow subset of trespassers
who enter property for hostile purposes, such as the commission of
criminal acts.166 All other trespassers are owed a new affirmative
tort duty by the land possessor to render aid or exercise whatever
reasonable care entails. 6 7
What would remain of the basic "no duty" rule if a jurisdiction
were to adopt this new Restatement is difficult to predict because
so much would be left open to new interpretation. Even the other
classic and sacrosanct "no duty" scenario where a person has no
duty to render aid to another unless he or she "takes charge" of the

public. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A(3). If the property is not
open to the public, the general default "no duty" rule of Section 314 applies. Id.
163. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 52 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 6 2009); but see Foster v.
LaPlante, 244 A.2d 803, 804 (Me. 1968) ("The trespasser . . . is not denied the
right to recover because his entry upon the [owner's] premises is wrongful, but
because his presence is not to be anticipated . . . ...); Mothershead v.
Greenbriar Country Club, Inc., 994 S.W.2d 80, 86 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (stating
that the general "no duty" rule for trespassers "is based not on the wrongful
nature of the trespasser's conduct, but on the possessor's inability to foresee
trespasser's [sic] presence and guard against injury."); 62 AM. JUR. 2D
Premises Liability § 206 (2010) ("The basis of the rule denying a trespasser a
right to recover for an injury is not the fact that the trespass is a wrongful act,
but that if his or her presence is not to be anticipated, the property owner
owes the trespasser no duty to take precautions for his or her safety.").
164. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 52 (Tentative Draft No. 6 2009).
165. See supra note 8.
166. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 52 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 6 2009) (stating that the
flagrant trespassers' invasion on land is intended to convey a sense of
"egregious or atrocious" conduct with a "malicious motive" or intent to commit
crime).
167. E.g., id. § 51 (stating general rule that land possessors owe a duty of
reasonable care to entrants).
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rescue168 could be challenged indirectly. For instance, a broadly
drafted "Good Samaritan" statute might, under Section 38, be
interpreted by a court as creating an affirmative duty where a
would-be rescuer could accomplish the rescue without endangering
himself or herself. 69 Similarly, a passerby's question of "Are you
all right?" or "Do you need help?" to an imperiled individual could,
under Section 42, be twisted into an offer to render aid that the
imperiled person relies upon.o70 The potential to use such broad
duty rules to fashion tort liability whenever a court wants there to
be tort liability is essentially boundless.
The question for jurisdictions contemplating adoption of the
new Restatement, therefore, is whether this highly subjective,
unpredictable, and transformative approach is superior to the
long-standing duty rules of the Second Restatement, which,
although imperfect, have resulted in consistent, balanced and
clearly understood duty rules over the past half century. While
states undoubtedly have an interest in developing tort law through
judicial decisions, such as those involving affirmative duties, it is
critical to understand and define a set of principles for how they
might do so. The new Restatement conceives a far broader set of
principles and a far less defined tether for courts; it is a trade-off
unlikely to result in fair and consistent liability rules.
B. Liability and LitigationImpacts
While the potential exists under Chapter 7 of the new
Restatement for courts to revisit, reshape, and create affirmative
tort duties, a separate issue exists as to what this would actually
mean from a liability and litigation perspective. A state's decision
to adopt Chapter 7, or parts thereof, in place of the Second
Restatement would introduce tremendous uncertainty into
litigation and expectations of liability exposure and produce a
chaotic effect on the practices of many individuals and businesses.
One example, discussed earlier, would be the impact of Sections 42
and 43 on those businesses that have traditionally sought to limit
liability through the hiring of independent contractors.171 If such
employment contracts could be interpreted to create new
affirmative duties, businesses would generally be more reluctant
to hire such contractors and an essential purpose behind these
agreements could be lost. Similarly, the practice of a company,
trade association, research organization, insurer, or other third
party engaging in risk reduction initiatives could be curtailed over
168. See supra note 83.
169. See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J.
247, 282-83 (1980) (discussing the difficulties of applying a duty to rescue, as
well as its negative effects on industriousness).
170. See supra Section II.B.
171. See supra note 138.
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fears of a court finding that the practice constituted an
undertaking giving rise to an affirmative duty. 172 Again, the public
policy implication here is that more physical injuries would result.
These effects are also exacerbated by the difficulty under the new
Restatement to disclaim an affirmative duty. 173
But this is still likely just the tip of the iceberg. The course of
major litigations could be irrevocably altered by Chapter 7. For
instance, asbestos litigation, which is in its fourth decade and
represents "the longest running mass tort" in United States
history, 174 could be vulnerable to attempts to expand duty in new
ways. In recent years, plaintiffs' lawyers have sought to continue
the litigation by expanding the scope of the duty owed to workers
exposed to asbestos to include "take home" exposures to family
members and relatives. 75 Courts have almost uniformly rejected
such an affirmative duty as outside the scope of the duty owed by
manufacturers or premises owners and not supported by sound
public policy. 176 The new Restatement would provide fertile ground
for an activist court to revisit this settled law, and, using some of
the avenues discussed throughout, impose new tort liability
against asbestos defendants. Likewise, the Restatement could be
employed to reinvigorate the "solvent bystander" strategy used in
asbestos litigation,177 whereby non-traditional defendants "far
removed from the scene of any putative wrongdoing" 7 8 become
ensnared in the litigation in place of traditional asbestos
80
defendants, 7 9 many of whom have filed for bankruptcy.
172. See supra notes 143-150 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 149.
174. Helen Freedman, Selected Ethical Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 37 Sw.
U. L. REV. 511, 511 (2008).
175. Mark A. Behrens & Frank Cruz-Alvarez, Premises Owner Liability for
Secondhand Asbestos Exposure: The Next Wave?, 7 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST
Soc'Y PRAc. GROUPS 145, 145 (2006).
176. E.g., Riedel v. ICI Americas, Inc., 968 A.2d 17, 25-27 (Del. 2009); CSX
Transp., Inc. v. Williams, 608 S.E.2d 208, 209-10 (Ga. 2005); In re Certified
Question from Fourteenth Dist. Court of Appeals of Texas, 740 N.W.2d 206,
216-22 (Mich. 2007); In re New York City Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d 115, 19922 (N.Y. 2005).
177. 'Medical Monitoring and Asbestos Litigation'-A Discussion with
Richard Scruggs and Victor Schwartz, 17 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: ASBESTOS 19
(2002) (quoting Mr. Scruggs).
178. Editorial, Lawyers Torch the Economy, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2001, at
A14.
179. See STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION 94 (2005)
(stating that "nontraditional" defendants account for more than half of
asbestos expenditures).
180. In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 747-48 (E. &
S.D.N.Y. 1991); see also Martha Neil, Backing Away from the Abyss, 92 A.B.A.
J. 26, 29 (2006) (reporting that an estimated eighty-five companies have filed
for bankruptcy due to asbestos related liability as of September 2006); Joseph
E. Stiglitz et al., The Impact of Asbestos Liabilities on Workers in Bankrupt
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Plaintiffs' lawyers have sought to cast a wider net and draw in
new defendants to keep the litigation going.
The duty of religious institutions presents another major area
of litigation that could be impacted by the liability-expanding
avenues discussed in this Article. An enterprising court could, for
example, use Chapter 7 to recognize a common law affirmative
duty from a custody statute or other law applicable to religious
institutions. In addition, a court could potentially use the "not
exclusive"sl list of "special relationships" under Section 40 of the
Restatement to find a new duty. Although the relationship
between religious institutions and parishioners has never been
viewed as giving rise to a special relationship, and in fact religious
organizations were historically afforded immunity along with
other charitable organizations, 182 the ambiguity of the term
"special relationship" and authorization from the Restatement to
find new "candidate[s]"183 could lead courts to create new
affirmative duties to act for the protection of others.
In practical terms, such findings could greatly expand
liability for religious institutions relating to alleged instances of
sexual abuse, conduct of church agents, and injuries sustained by
church volunteers or other church members. This could occur
without warning or any prior notice. It could also potentially
impact past cases; when a court recognizes a new duty under
common law, it may be treated as if the duty had always
existed.184 Importantly, the mere possibility of such a finding by a
court would be enough to dramatically increase insurance
premiums, and inflate settlement pressures.
Chapter 7 could also potentially be employed to dramatically
upset and expand tort liability in environmental litigation.
Presently, there are a myriad of state and federal environmental
regulations that could be interpreted by a court to recognize an
affirmative duty of care. 8 5 Many, if not all, of these laws are
Firms, 12 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 51, 52 (2003) (stating that bankruptcies due to
asbestos litigation had led to a loss of 52,000 to 60,000, with each worker
losing, on average, $25,000 to $50,000 in wages over the course of his or her
career).
181. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM, § 40 cmt. o (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005).
182. See Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Defining the Duty of Religious
Institutions to Protect Others: Surgical Instruments, Not Machetes, Are
Required, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 11, 13-17 (2005) (discussing the charitable
immunity doctrine and its demise).
183. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM, § 40 cmt. o (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005).
184. See Bradley Scott Shannon, The Retroactive and ProspectiveApplication
of JudicialDecisions, 26 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 811, 812 (2003) (noting that
"the retroactive application of judicial decisions remains the norm").
185. See Kenneth S. Abraham, The Relation Between Civil Liability and
Environmental Regulation: An Analytical Overview, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 379,
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designed to protect people from environmental harms; hence, they
could be read to satisfy the loose criteria of Section 38.186 Some of
these laws may also directly implicate very controversial topics in
environmental law, such as alleged global climate change.18 7 If
courts could take laws, such as regulatory standards, and turn
them into state common law tort law duties as well, then
regulatory violations could suddenly open the door to additional
tort liability. The effect would be double punishment for a
regulatory violation and the likely establishment of the tort
system as the principal enforcement mechanism for alleged
environmental harms. This could significantly impact specific
litigations, such as climate change litigation in spite of unanimous
federal district court rulings stating that the tort system, under
the theory of public nuisance, is not an appropriate tool for
regulating alleged global climate change88 and a current
disagreement among federal appellate courts over the issue.189
392-95 (2002) (examining avenue of civil liability from environmental
regulatory laws); Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening of America and the
Graying of United States Environmental Law: Reflections on Environmental
Law's First Three Decades in the United States, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 75, 77-90
(2001) (discussing the expansion of environmental statutes beginning in the
1970s).
186. See supra Section II.A.
187. See 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 EPA (2010) (joint final rule of EPA and
Department of Transportation's National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration reducing allowable greenhouse-gas emissions from light-duty
vehicles); 74 Fed. Reg. 56,264 (2009) (EPA final rule requiring certain sources
that annually emit more than 25,000 tons of greenhouse gases (and, in some
instances, less) to report those emissions to EPA).
188. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 859 (5th Cir. 2009) (classaction suit by Mississippi coastal residents and landowners against oil and
electric-power companies, alleging that their emissions "contribut[ed] to global
warming" and "added to the ferocity of Hurricane Katrina"), rev'd 585 F.3d
855 (2009) vacated, 598 F.3d 208, appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir.
2010); Native Vill. of Kivalina v. Exxon-Mobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 868
(N.D. Cal. 2009) (suit by Eskimo village against twenty-four oil, energy, and
utility companies, alleging that their emissions have, by contributing to global
warming, caused Arctic sea ice to diminish), appeal pending, No. 09-17490
(9th Cir.); California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755, 2007 WL 2726871,
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (suit by State of California against automobile
manufacturers alleging that the vehicles they produce emit carbon dioxide,
which causes global warming, which reduces snow pack and increases sea
levels, resulting in reduced water supplies, increased risk of flooding,
increased coastal erosion, and increased risk and intensity of wildfires);
Connecticut v. Amer. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (suit brought by eight states, the city of New York, and several land
trusts alleging electric and power companies were public nuisances because
they caused global warming by emitting "greenhouse gasses"), rev'd, 582 F.3d
309 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (2010).
189. Compare Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1055 (5th Cir.
2010) (dismissing appeal after court of appeals, en banc, vacated panel
opinion, but then lost a quorum because of one judge's recusal, leaving trial
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While global climate change litigation is presently a topic of great
debate in the legal community,19 0 the same concerns arise with
any form of environmental regulation.
These litigation examples represent just a few of what would
likely be many attempts to expand critical duty determinations if a
jurisdiction adopted Chapter 7 and left lower court judges to run
with it. In addition, there are an untold number of important new
duty questions that would need to be addressed. For instance, in
applying Section 42, what if "reasonable care under the
circumstances" and the care expressly provided for by a contract or
promise to render specific assistance conflict? Could liability still
be imposed? An example of this issue might arise when a contract
states that one party will come to the aid of another in an
emergency (that is, reduce the risk of physical harm to the other)
by calling 9-1-1. If an emergency occurs and the contractually
bound party tries reasonably to render medical aid on his or her
own, but is unsuccessful, does the failure to call for backup now
give rise to tort liability? Or, conversely, what if the contractually
bound party is an employer with an on-site medical staff? Would
calling 9-1-1 and satisfying the contracted affirmative duty of care
preclude tort liability if the employer instructed the medical staff
not to intervene and render assistance even though it would be
reasonable (and faster) to do so? In both situations, the
contractually bound party is "taking charge" of the rescue; what is
the scope of the duty owed? Are there now two separate
affirmative duties?
These are the murky questions courts would have to wade
through in adopting Chapter 7. It is a path riddled with potential
landmines that could give way to substantial new tort liability.
The uncertainty from these issues alone has the potential to
augment existing litigations, drive up liability insurance costs, and
otherwise adversely impact a state's economy. These are not the
sound public policy objectives that Restatement projects are
intended to promote. Rather, the likely result would be sudden
and unanticipated liability for individuals and businesses. It is
also liability the full extent of which is unknown.

court's initial dismissal of global warming suit as nonjusticiable political
question to stand), with Connecticut v. Amer. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309,
323-32 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding that suit over increased carbon dioxide
emissions was not a nonjusticiable political question), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct.
813 (2010).
190. See, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz, Phil Goldberg & Christopher E. Appel,
Global Warming Lawsuits: Poised for Supreme Court Hot List?, WASH. LEGAL
FOUND. LEGAL OPINION LETTER, July 9, 2010, at 1-2, available at
http://www.wlf.org/publishing/publication-detail.asp?id=2180 (discussing the
increase in climate change regulation through litigation and the likelihood
that the Supreme Court will take up the issue of its validity).
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CONCLUSION

Professor Michael Green, Reporter to the Restatement (Third)
of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm, and former
ATLA president Larry Stewart are correct when they said that
this new Restatement is a "powerful new tool."191 While many
parts of the new Restatement provide clear and sound liability
rules, there are others, such as those listed in Professor Green and
Stewart's "Top Ten" article, which fall far short of this goal and
open the door to unprecedented expansions of liability. Among
these, Chapter 7 poses to dramatically alter where and how
affirmative tort duties are recognized under state common law.
Chapter 7 would arm judges with broad authority to circumvent
precedent and create new duties in tort law. As a result, civil
defendants are at serious risk of substantial and unexpected
liability in jurisdictions that choose to forsake the comparative
consistency, predictability, and balance of the Second
Restatement's approach to affirmative duties and adopt this part
of the new Restatement. The decision ultimately is in the hands of
state high court judges. If sound public policy rules are to be
preserved and legal chaos averted, these courts will reject the top
plaintiffs' tools and maintain the common law's traditional balance
and fairness.

191. Green & Stewart, supra note 1, at 44.

